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Introduction
The crisis in Mali has brought the Sahel to the centre of internation-
al attention. This fragile region not only suffers from longstanding 
development challenges, but also from an acute security vacuum 
that has triggered military intervention. A key task is understand-
ing the principal challenges to political stability and economic de-
velopment in the Sahel. The European Union (EU) has engaged in 
the region, but an analytical perspective should indeed ask whether 
the response is up to the challenges currently afflicting the region. 
Another key aspect to the regional crisis is whether or not the in-
ternational and regional responses can break the fragility cycle of 
humanitarian emergencies, economic under-development, political 
instability, porous borders and a lack of security. 
There is also a need to understand the range of local and regional 
actors involved in the crisis. A comprehensive approach to the local 
and regional dynamics must uncover the role of different regional 
powers, whether or not certain groups benefit from a protracted 
crisis and what interests are at stake. The military and security com-
ponent of the response is vital too. In addition to the EU mission to 
Niger and the wider region (EUCAP Sahel) there is the direct French 
military intervention in Mali and the deployment of an EU Training 
Mission (EUTM) to that country, plus the gearing up of the African-led 
support mission to Mali named AFISMA. A challenge however arises 
in putting in place an organisational division of labour between the 
different political, humanitarian, developmental and military actors 
and responses. How military assistance to the region ties-in with the 
broader developmental and security objectives is vital. 
Many questions have therefore arisen as a consequence of the cri-
sis. Has the EU the ability to cope with such a complex and dynami-
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cally evolving security environment? How have divergent views on 
the political roadmap to be adopted, and the lack of resources at 
the African level, impacted the crisis response? Can the different 
players involved agree on what are the most pertinent needs and 
challenges to be addressed? Are they ready for long-term engage-
ment? Can regional organisations effectively collaborate and are 
they able to successfully integrate different agendas? Following 
a conference organised by the Institute for European Studies, 
the Egmont Institute and the Observatoire de l’Afrique on these 
questions this Policy Brief builds on the findings of the confer-
ence and provides an analytical overview of the regional crisis 
by focusing on the main challenges facing the Sahel, the local 
and regional dynamics at play and the military and security re-
sponses. Information on “The Sahel Crisis: Where do European 
and African Perspectives Meet?” conference can be found at the 
foot of this Policy Brief.  
The Main Challenges in the Sahel
Most conference speakers agreed that the eruption of the crisis 
in Mali should not have come as a surprise. Trouble had been 
brewing in the wider Sahel region for some time. From the dec-
ades-long protracted crisis in Northern Mali involving the Tuareg 
and the internal governance problem in Mali to the 2010 coup in 
Niger and the 2011 downfall of Qaddafi in Libya, the early warn-
ing signs were there. Regional and international partners were 
unable to provide a rapid and comprehensive response to these 
crisis signs. Early warning systems are in place, but no regional 
organisation had the capabilities, the reach or a common politi-
cal vision to address the fragility in the Sahel region. The United 
States was unwilling to take the lead and the United Nations is 
only now mustering its own response. As a consequence, the 
root causes of the Sahel crisis festered and erupted in Mali under 
the guise of an armed rebellion bent on toppling the govern-
ment. The combination of this fragile situation and European 
interests (Simon, Mattelaer and Hadfield, 2012) led to the French 
military intervention ‘Operation Serval’. 
One important aspect raised by the conference was that the Sa-
hel crisis requires more than just military intervention over the 
longer-term. The Sahel is a belt of instability marked by migra-
tions of people, refugees, the trafficking of goods (including 
weapons), weak governance, chronic economic under-develop-
ment, humanitarian emergencies, widespread malnutrition and 
competition for natural resources such as food (Baudot, 2013). 
There is no guarantee that the crisis begins and ends in Mali, 
however, as other countries in the region remain fragile. Borders 
are porous in the Sahel and a lack of governmental control over 
a desertified space that is geographically similar in size to West-
ern Europe is a key challenge (Fiott, 2011). It is no wonder that 
multinational rebel and terrorist groups, not bound to national 
borders, and reveling in the relative ease of arms and narcotics 
trafficking routes, have found the region attractive.
As participants learned at the conference, the EU response to the 
crisis has been multi-faceted in conception. The 2011 publica-
tion of the EU’s Sahel Strategy for Security and Development has 
sought to implement a comprehensive approach to the crisis. 
The EU has made financial contributions to Mali, through the 
European Development Fund and the Instrument for Stability, on 
condition that Mali adheres to the agreed political roadmap. Af-
ter the military coup the European Commission interrupted its 
aid to the Malian government, however, the aid is now being re-
sumed and is focused on supporting justice, infrastructure, food 
security and decentralisation. This last focus was acknowledged 
as an important political challenge in Mali. The EU has also deliv-
ered humanitarian assistance to the region without any political 
conditionality. Furthering the comprehensive approach, the EU 
has also deployed two civil-military missions under the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In 2012 through EUCAP Sahel 
Niger, which among other tasks is designed to train police and 
build capacities for the rule of law in Niger. In 2013 an EUTM to 
Mali was deployed with the task of training Mali’s armed forces. 
The deployment of an EU Special Representative to the Sahel re-
gion is foreseen. The EU also envisages support for the organisa-
tion of the next elections, which are regarded as necessary to 
restoring democratic order in Mali.
Some participants questioned the EU’s approach and its priori-
ties, and they stated that the EU should focus more on the people 
on the ground by concentrating on building resilience, the crea-
tion of social safety nets and the challenges around pastoralism 
in the region. As state fragility is indeed a challenge, the partici-
pation of citizens and the creation of checks and balances are 
essential to building a sustainable state from the bottom-up. The 
issue of accountability is not only essential to addressing fragil-
ity but also for development assistance. 
Local and Regional Dynamics
A long-term vision for the Sahel region involving all local and 
regional actors is required (Lacher and Tull, 2013). Any response 
must be inescapably regional in scope and ambition. Indeed, a 
lack of regional responses, mechanisms and capabilities played 
into the hands of those seeking to profit from instability in the 
Sahel. Fragile states such as Niger, Libya and Mauritania need to 
be brought into a coherent regional response over the longer-
term. Algeria is key to such a response. Root causes that are 
shared by the Sahel countries need addressing, and the devel-
opment of full spectrum governance capabilities over large ge-
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ographical areas should be the aim (Théroux-Bénoni, 2013). As 
an immediate local and regional response, the risk of contagion 
spreading from Mali to the broader region needs to be contained. 
One must not forget, stated one expert speaker, that the Sahel 
region links into a broader Saharan political space that is also at 
risk from instability.
Panellists speaking at the conference also argued that a number 
of local-level actions need attention over the longer-term. The cri-
sis in Mali largely derived from a lack of government presence 
throughout the country. Security and social services were sparse in 
the North of Mali. Once the country has recovered some semblance 
of country-wide security, then addressing government legitimacy 
and accountability and the creation of a viable economy are key. 
However, any local-level comprehensive response to the country’s 
challenges must also seek to promote reconciliation with margin-
alised groups such as the Tuareg (Lecocq, 2010). A more inclusive 
political system in Mali will bring on board civil society as a key 
actor in driving a sustainable political settlement forward.
But what is necessary for Mali is also necessary for other countries 
in the Sahel region. A lack of political accountability, failures in 
democratic governance and the rule of law, human rights abuses 
and socio-economic under-development are cross-border issues; 
even if individual countries are different. A particular problem 
for the Sahel region is chronic economic under-development, and 
more will need to be done on a regional basis to address factors 
such as youth unemployment – jobs should help dry up recruit-
ment to terrorist and rebel groups. Furthermore, no amount of 
aid can substitute for regional cooperation. However, any regional 
response will be inescapably political. Regional tensions exist be-
tween players such as Algeria and Mauritania and regional group-
ings such as the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS).  
From Military Intervention to Security Assistance
Before any longer-term focus on economic development, political 
inclusion and government accountability can be achieved in the re-
gion the immediate concern is restoring security. Without security 
there can be no sustainable political and economic development 
– but security will depend on a legitimate political process. While 
the French prevented a bad situation from getting much worse 
through Operation Serval, the immediate military phase is about 
ensuring security while the French withdraw militarily from the 
country. French military withdrawal from Mali raises many ques-
tions about whether AFISMA is able to fill the security vacuum that 
will be left. One must also question the Malian army’s abilities to 
regain full control of the North of the country, and whether they 
will be prepared to engage rebel groups if they resort to asym-
metric tactics. Indeed, the Malian government and security forces 
should not assume that Operation Serval has secured Mali for 
good. This last point was particularly stressed by the conference 
speakers. 
In this sense, EUTM Mali has an important and mammoth task. 
With the aim of training and restructuring Mali’s forces so that 
they can perform conventional military tasks, this will not be an 
easy venture for the five hundred and fifty or so European person-
nel being mobilised. There are longstanding divisions within the 
Malian army linked to national political power games, and the EU 
mission has to take these into account, as intervention will impact 
the internal power balance, even if the evolution of this balance 
remains uncertain. It will also be a challenging test case for the 
EU’s comprehensive approach. The Mission will have to simulta-
neously train the Malian armed forces to safeguard the military 
advances provided for by Operational Serval, while also ensuring 
that the armed forces conduct themselves within the boundaries 
of international humanitarian law and in keeping with broader rec-
onciliation efforts. Supporting and strengthening the Malian mili-
tary command structure is seen as vital in this regard. 
Considering the human rights violations committed, the partici-
pants also raised questions concerning the legitimacy of working 
with the current Malian army. The Malian army cannot be allowed 
to continue to be a source of instability in the country – this will 
however depend on the progress on the political front. Lessons 
should be learned from EU Security Sector Reform activities in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Guinea Bissau. As a response, 
various speakers mentioned the EUTM mission that is training So-
malian security forces as a successful example of EU engagement.
National and regional forces will inevitably take up the necessary 
longer-term military and security tasks. While the medium-term 
will see a need for the strengthening of local law and security en-
forcement, it should not escape the attention of interested parties 
such as the EU that more than military training may be required if 
Mali’s problems are to be addressed over the longer-term (Cool-
saet, Biscop and Coelmont, 2013: 3). Indeed, there is the key issue 
of ensuring that the Malian army has the capabilities of retaining 
security against rebel groups. These groups being armed with so-
phisticated weaponry coming from across the border from places 
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such as Libya and further afield. Some of the conference speak-
ers notioned how capabilities and equipment may have to be 
addressed sooner rather than later, especially if security is to be 
put on a sustainable footing in Mali and the wider Sahel region.  
Conclusion  
 
This Policy Brief argues that the long-term response to the Sahel 
region has only just begun. This was a point also strongly under-
lined by the conference participants. The region is very much at 
the end of the beginning phase. The principle aspect of a long-
term response to the Sahel region remains local, national and 
regional. No international actor involved in the region can pre-
tend to fully understand all the political nuances and dynamics at 
play in the Sahel. This point should translate into prudence and a 
cautious approach. Yes, for international partners such as the EU 
long-term political will and funding for African responses will be 
essential. Yes, a common regional approach to development and 
security, which takes into due consideration porous borders and 
the transnational dynamic to the crisis, is necessary. However, 
whether Mali’s armed forces will be resilient and willing enough 
to secure the whole country is the most immediate challenge. Ef-
forts to reinforce the capabilities of national security forces will 
have to go hand-in-hand with a legitimate political process to lay 
the foundations for a renewed social and economic development 
process. The road will however be long and tenuous.
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